We present an algorithm that constructively recognises when a given black box group is a nontrivial homomorphic image of the orthogonal group Ω ε (d, q) for known ε, d and q. The algorithm runs in polynomial time assuming oracles for handling SL(2, q) subgroups and discrete logarithms in F * q .
Introduction
For more than ten years a "Matrix Group Project" has been underway, whose goal is to produce algorithms to determine the structure of the group G = S generated by a set S of invertible matrices over a finite field (cf. KS3] ). Ultimately this reduces to problems involving the composition factors of G: determine them and provide algorithms for computing effectively within them. In order to handle quotient groups, this question has been generalised to the setting of "black box" groups, in which we only have the ability to calculate such things as products of elements of G = S within suitable time constraints.
The present paper is one of a series [CFL, KS1, BK, Br2] that deal with algorithmic questions concerning simple black box groups. While the emphasis of all of these papers has been on proving theoretical bounds on the timing and reliability of the algorithms they contain, work is also underway to provide practically efficient implementations that can be incorporated into the computer algebra systems MAGMA and GAP.
The algorithms presented in [KS1] solve the desired computational problems for all classical black box groups G = S , but they do not run in time polynomial in the input length. The groups PSL (d, q) , PSp(d, q) and PSU (d, q) were dealt with in [BK, Br2] , in polynomial time under additional computational assumptions. The present paper extends this result to the remaining classical groups: the orthogonal groups PΩ ε (d, q) . Consequently, the class of "polynomial-time with oracle" constructive recognition algorithms now includes all classical groups (cf. [KS3] ). Ideally we would have liked to present a uniform treatment of the classical groups, along the same lines as [KS1, Br1] . However, while the general architectures of the algorithms for the unitary and orthogonal groups are identical, the substantially different techniques used to handle various subproblems ultimately led to both [Br2] and the present paper. Moreover, awkward aspects of orthogonal groups make the solution of many subproblems more technical than their counterparts in the other classical groups.
In order to give statements of our results, we need some terminology and notation. A black box group is a group whose elements are encoded (not necessarily uniquely) using 0-1 strings of uniform length N , and which is equipped with an oracle (the "black box") that finds a string representing the product of two given elements, finds a string representing the inverse of a given element, and tests whether a given string represents the identity element of the group. If we are given G as G = S for some subset S of G, then the input length is N |S|.
Let H be a concrete group (such as a group of matrices or permutations), and let G = S be a given black box group. We say that a homomorphism Ψ : H → G is effective if there is a procedure (which may be deterministic or randomised) that computes hΨ ∈ G for any given h ∈ H , and also a procedure that computes some preimage for any given element of H Ψ .
For a prime power q, an SL(2, q)-oracle is a deterministic algorithm which, for any input black box group G isomorphic either to SL (2, q) or PSL (2, q) , produces an effective epimorphism Ψ : SL(2, q) → G. A DLog(F * q )-oracle is a deterministic algorithm that computes discrete logarithms in F * q , given a generator of F * q . The following complexity parameters are used in our timing estimates:
μ: An upper bound on the time requirement for each group operation in G (i.e., the cost of using the black box). ξ : An upper bound on the time requirement, per element, for the construction of independent, (nearly) uniformly distributed random elements of G. A fundamental result of Babai [Ba] produces such elements in a black box group in time polynomial in the input length. We assume that ξ μ|S|. χ : An upper bound on the time requirement for each application of either of the hypothesised SL(2, q)-or DLog(F * q )-oracles.
Our main result is as follows: See Section 2.2 for the definition of Las Vegas algorithms. In the theorem we assume that d is even if q is, as the odd-dimensional groups in characteristic 2 are symplectic groups and hence were already handled in [BK] . The cases Ω − (4, q) ∼ = PSL(2, q 2 ) and Ω − (6, q) were excluded from the statement of the theorem because they are most easily handled as groups defined over F q 2 : the 4-dimensional group Ω − (4, q) using an SL(2, q 2 )-oracle, and the 6-dimensional group Ω − (6, q) using the SU(4, q) algorithm presented in [Br2, 6.2] . (The latter hypothesises a discrete log oracle for a cyclic group of order q + 1 in addition to the oracles in the above theorem; see Section 5 for more about these groups.) Other well-known isomorphisms deal with the remaining low-dimensional cases: Ω(3, q) ∼ = PSL (2, q) and Ω + (4, q) ∼ = SL (2, q) • SL (2, q) are both handled using the SL(2, q)-oracle; and Ω(5, q) ∼ = PSp(4, q) is handled using the algorithm presented in [BK] . The group PΩ + (6, q) is recognised using the algorithm in [BK] for the isomorphic group PSL(4, q); see Section 2.2 below.
We prove somewhat more than is stated in the theorem, and thereby satisfy additional requirements of the Matrix Group Project [L-G] . For example, we construct a new generating S * from the original generating set S having the property that, for any given g ∈ G, we can produce a preimage of g by writing a straight-line program from S * to g and then evaluating the resulting straight-line program in Ω ε (d, q) starting from S * Ψ −1 . Keeping track of the steps used to construct S * from S, we also obtain straight-line programs from the set S to any given element g of G.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we summarise the elementary properties of orthogonal groups needed for our algorithm, and also discuss the algorithmic background necessary for computation in black box groups. The main algorithm is presented in Sections 3 and 4. Constructive recognition algorithms naturally consist of two phases: a preprocessing algorithm that sets up a data structure defining a suitable epimorphism; and an application algorithm that uses this data structure to compute images and preimages of given elements. The preprocessing phase is handled in Section 3, and the application phase in Section 4. Section 5 indicates extensions and variations of Theorem 1.1. For example, in practice G is only probably a homomorphic image of the stated orthogonal group, but this is readily dealt with merely by assuming that G is, indeed, a homomorphic image: if the algorithm succeeds, then one checks that G satisfies a suitable presentation for the stated orthogonal group (cf. Section 5).
Preliminaries
In this section we summarise the required orthogonal group and algorithmic background (cf. [KS1, KL, Ta] ).
Orthogonal groups
Let V be a vector space of dimension d 6 over F q , where q = p k , and let φ be a nondegenerate quadratic form on 
In (b), the number suitable t.s. lines Σ in any such 4-space is s 1 4 − 4 = 2(q − 1). Hence, 
Point stabilisers and root groups
Let B be a standard basis for V and, for any i ∈ {±1, . . . , ±m}, let x i = e i . Then the point stabiliser Ω ε (V ) x i is a semidirect product
, and consists of all isometries of the form 
In particular,
The Ω ε (V )-conjugates of r i (w) will be referred to generically in this paper as root elements; conjugates of the groups 
Proof. (a) This is well known. (b) Parts 1 and 2 follow from a matrix calculation; they may also be deduced using an argument similar to [KS1, Lemma 4.7(ii) ]. For part 3, note that a choice u 1 is not in Z(U ) with probability at least 1 − 1/q 2d−6 . For such a u 1 , it is straightforward to check that C U (u 1 ) has order q 2d−8 ; thus, with probability at least 1 − 1/q, u 2 does not commute with u 1 . 2
Homomorphisms and isometries
For n < d, a subgroup of Ω ε (d, q) = Ω ε (V ) that induces Ω ε (n, q) on some nondegenerate n-space of V , and the identity on the orthogonal complement of this n-space, will be called a naturally embedded
Suppose that d > 6, and let J be a naturally embedded Ω + (6, q)-subgroup of G. Furthermore, let Ψ J : Ω + (V J ) → J be a fixed isomorphism, where V J is a nondegenerate 6-space in V of Witt index 3. Let x + ∈ V J be any singular point, and put
, and let L denote the group (Ω ε (V ) x + ,x − ) Φ < G, where x − ∈ V J is not perpendicular to x + . (The groups Q and L do not depend on the choice of Φ.) By (2.5),
defines a nondegenerate L-invariant quadratic form on Q, while 
The uniqueness of Ψ now follows from the fact that f determines the image of Q(x + ), while Ψ J determines the image of l .
Existence: First let Φ denote any epimorphism extending Ψ J . Then Φ restricts on
Hence there is a matrix C ∈ GO ε (d, q) inducing the identity on V J and sending w i → w i for 1 i d − 6.
We claim that the epimorphism Ψ :
Hence the restriction of Ψ to Q(x + ) agrees with f . It follows that Ψ extends both Ψ J and f , as claimed. 2
Algorithmic preliminaries
We now summarise the relevant notions and procedures needed for computing with black box groups. The reader is referred to chapters 1 and 2 of [Se] for a detailed treatment of this topic.
Monte Carlo and Las Vegas algorithms
We will consider randomised algorithms. Such an algorithm is called Monte Carlo if the output may be incorrect, but an upper bound on the probability of that can be prescribed by the user; thus, there is always an output, but there is also an uncomfortable possibility of error. A randomised algorithm is called Las Vegas if the output is always correct, but there is a possibility that "failure" is output, and an upper bound on the probability of that can be prescribed by the user; no errors can occur, so this is more comforting.
Straight-line programs
Let X be a list of elements of a group G, and let g ∈ G. Informally, a straight-line program (SLP) of length m from X to g is a sequence (g 1 , . . . , g m ) of group elements such that g m = g and, for each i, one of the following holds: g i ∈ X; or g i = g −1 j for some j < i; or g i = g j g k for some j, k < i. SLPs can be thought of as space-efficient words. Since we do not always want to compute or store each of the group elements g i , we more formally define an SLP from X to g to be a sequence (w 1 , . . . , w m ) such that, for each i, either w i is a positive integer (representing the w i th element of X), or w i = (j, −1) for some j < i (representing w −1 j ), or w i = (j, k) for some j, k < i (representing w j w k ), such that if each expression in the sequence is evaluated in the obvious way, then the value of w m is g. This more abstract definition enables us to construct SLPs inside one group and evaluate them in another.
Order properties
By a fundamental theorem of Zsigmondy [Zs] , if p is a prime and n 2, then there is a prime r dividing p n − 1 but not p i − 1 for 1 i < n, except when either p = 2 and n = 6, or n = 2 and p is a Mersenne prime. Such a prime r is called a primitive prime divisor (ppd) of p n − 1. For n > 1, we call an integer j > 1 dividing p n − 1 a ppd 
The SL(2, q)-oracle
Our algorithm assumes the availability of an oracle which, for any given black box group G isomorphic to SL(2, q) for known q, returns an effective isomorphism Ψ : SL(2, q) → G. In particular, the oracle constructs a new generating set S * for G, and provides a procedure which, for any given g ∈ G, writes an SLP from S * to g. We assume that χ μ log q (the time required to evaluate an SLP of length log q within G). Remark 2.14. All SLP procedures in fact take as input a string representing some element the black box group G (recall that the elements of G are not necessarily uniquely encoded). We assume that the SLPs output by the SL(2, q)-oracle for strings representing the same element of G are identical.
Remark 2.15. There will be situations in which the SL(2, q)-oracle is called for a group G, which is only probably isomorphic to SL (2, q) . If it happens that G ∼ = SL(2, q), then we assume the oracle returns false.
Applying the oracle to quotient groups
We will need to handle the following situation. Let G be the given black box orthogonal group, and suppose we have (generators for) a black box subgroup H of G such that, for some N P H , we have H/N ∼ = SL(2, q). We do not have generators for N , but there is an efficient deterministic test for membership in this subgroup. This is sufficient to enable us to compute with H/N as a black box group: the elements of H/N are the elements of H ; group operations are performed exactly as they are in H ; but the test for whether or not a given string represents the identity is performed instead using the membership test for N .
Thus, in this setting, we may apply the SL(2, q)-oracle to the quotient group H/N . (For more about practical aspects of such applications in our specific setting, see Remark 4.7.) In particular, we obtain a set S * H ⊂ H such that S * H N/N = H/N , having the property that, for any given h ∈ H , an SLP can be obtained from S * H to an element h 0 ∈ H such that hN = h 0 N .
In the situation described above, we shall wish to use the SL(2, q)-oracle to construct (nearly) uniformly distributed random elements of the normal subgroup N . This is achieved as follows. Using the given generators for H , construct (nearly) uniformly distributed random elements h ∈ H . For each such element, the SL(2, q)-oracle is then called within the quotient group H/N to write an SLP from S * H to h 0 ∈ H with hN = h 0 N . The elements h −1 h 0 are now (nearly) uniformly distributed random elements of N . (For, by Remark 2.14, SLPs returned by the SL(2, q)-oracle to elements of the same coset are identical.)
Algorithms for Ω + (6, q)
Our general algorithm makes essential use of subgroups isomorphic to Ω + (6, q), and requires that we be able to recognise them constructively as 6-dimensional groups. The following is a version of Theorem 1.1 for the single case d = 6, ε = 1.
Lemma 2.16.
There is an O(log q{ξ + χ log q + μ log 2 q})-time Las Vegas algorithm which, with probability > 3/4, when given a black box group G = S , known to be a nontrivial homomorphic image of Ω + (6, q), and having available SL(2, q)-and DLog(F * q )-oracles, constructs an effective epimorphism Ψ : Proof. Since PΩ + (6, q) ∼ = PSL(4, q), we use the algorithm in [BK] to obtain an effective epimorphism Φ : G → PSL(4, q) = PSL(W ). Straightforward linear algebra provides an isomorphism θ :
q . Although computing the θ -image of any given element of PSL(W ) is elementary, computing preimages requires a few comments.
Let ⊥ refer to perpendicularity with respect to the usual dot product relative to the usual basis w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 of W . For 1 i = j 4, the group of ( w i , w ⊥ j )-transvections of PSL(W ) maps, under θ , to the long root group R(w i ∧ w ⊥ j ) of PΩ + (6, q). Let T be the union of O(k)-size generating sets for the 12 long root groups R(w i ∧ w ⊥ j ), obtained as the θ -images of generating sets of the 12 groups of ( w i , w ⊥ j )-transvections of W . To find hθ −1 for a given h ∈ PΩ + (6, q), we write an SLP from T to h using the deterministic algorithm in [Br1, Theorem 1.1], and then evaluate it from T θ −1 .
The map Φθ : G → PΩ + (6, q) is thus an effective epimorphism. The centre of G may now be constructed as follows using a standard short presentation for PΩ + (6, q) arising from elementary matrices [BGKLP] . Evaluate all of the relators from the appropriate elements of G. If the identity of G is obtained for all of them, then G is isomorphic to PΩ + (6, q); else at least one of the relations evaluates to a generator of Z(G), namely to the element corresponding to −1 ∈ Ω + (6, q). Now modify Φθ to produce an effective epimorphism Ψ : Ω + (6, q) → G, in accordance with Theorem 1.1.
The stated complexity arises from the call to [BK, Theorem 1 .1] (with d = 4 and q > 17) to construct an isomorphism Φ : G → PSL(4, q), which dominates the timing. That algorithm also accounts for the reliability stated in the lemma, and provides the routine for computing preimages. The routine for computing images is in [Br1, Theorem 1.1] (also see Section 4.1). 2
Constructing an isomorphism
This section contains the heart of our algorithm: the preprocessing phase that sets up a data structure for an effective epimorphism from a concrete matrix group to a given black box group. Let G = S be the given black box group, known to be a nontrivial homomorphic image of Ω ε (d, q) for known d, q = p k and ε ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. In view of Lemma 2.16, and the discussion following Theorem 1.1, we may assume that d 7. Our data structure will consist of the following components:
(a) A generating set T for the group of matrices Ω ε (d, q) . (b) A new generating set S * for G, whose elements are constructed using SLPs from the original generating set S.
phism will be our effective epimorphism; its effectiveness will be established following the application phase in Section 4.)
(e) Several useful elements of J together with their preimages in Ω ε (d, q) .
Preliminary constructions for "large" fields
Throughout this subsection we will assume that q 16. Analogous constructions for smaller field sizes will be given in Section 3.2.
Our first goal is to obtain generators for a naturally embedded Ω + (6, q)-subgroup J of G, together with an effective isomorphism Ψ J : Ω + (6, q) → J (cf. (d) above). The isomorphism Ψ J will be important for two reasons. First, it will allow us to construct useful elements of J to be used later in our algorithm (cf. (e)). Second, our target epimorphism Ω ε (d, q) → G will be constructed so as to extend Ψ J .
Our other preliminary task is to construct a subgroup Q of G, of order q d−2 , corresponding to some subgroup Q(x i ) of Ω ε (d, q) , as well as a certain complement to Q in N G (Q) (cf. Section 2.1.1).
The elements σ and a
We begin by giving a Las Vegas procedure that takes as input the given black box group G and returns elements a, σ ∈ G that act on the underlying module in a special manner. (Note that all ppd # (p; )-tests in the following procedure are performed using Lemma 2.13.)
For up 96n choices τ ∈ G, proceed as follows.
Test whether
If, for some choice τ , all of the tests performed in steps 1-3 are in the affirmative, then return the pair (σ, a). Report failure if all 96n choices fail at least one of the tests.
Lemma 3.2. Procedure 3.1 is a Las Vegas algorithm that returns a ppd # (p; nk) element σ , and a ppd # (p; k)-element a whose support in the natural module underlying G is a hyperbolic line upon which σ induces the identity. The procedure succeeds with probability
Proof. The routine is extracted from [Br1, Section 4.3 .1], where such a procedure is given more generally for all classical groups: the correctness, timing and reliability estimates are taken directly from there. 2
Constructing J
The following is a Las Vegas subroutine that takes as input the element a just constructed, together with the group G, and returns a (constructively recognised) naturally embedded Ω + (6, q)-subgroup. Procedure 3.3. For up to 2 16 choices (g 1 , g 2 ) ∈ G × G, proceed as follows:
2. Use Lemma 2.16 to test, constructively, whether J ∼ = Ω + (6, q).
If we obtain a suitable J for some g 1 , g 2 , then return the effective isomorphism Ψ J : Ω + (6, q) → J constructed in step 2. Report failure if none of the choices give rise to a suitable J . 
Lemma 3.4. Procedure 3.3 is a Las Vegas algorithm that returns a naturally embedded Ω + (6, q)-subgroup J, and effective isomorphism
Ψ J : Ω + (6, q) → J, with probability > 1 − 1/e 3 > 7/8, in O(log q{ξ + χ log q + μ log 2 q})-time.
Some elements of J
From now on, F q will denote the field constructed along with the effective isomorphism Ψ J : Ω + (6, q) = Ω + (V J ) → J ; ρ will denote a fixed generator of F * q . Define a nondegenerate quadratic form φ, and associated symmetric form ( , ), on the row space V := F d q such that the usual basis of V is a standard basis B (see (2.2) ). Matrices in Ω + (6, q) will always be written relative to the standard basis {e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e −1 , e −2 , e −3 } of V J . We may also assume that x + := e 1 and x − := e −1 are the 1-dimensional eigenspaces of aΨ
We identify these transformations with their corresponding matrices relative to B.
Use Lemma 2.16(a) to construct all of the following elements of J in O(log q(μ log q))-time:
h is an analogue of the element s used in [KS1, 4.4.2(v) ]; by (2.7), h has order (q − 1)/(2, q − 1), acting on Q as the scalar ρ 2 .)
(N.B. h + is an analogue of the element s + used in [KS1, 4.4.2(vi) ].) (v) A four-element generating set for
Here r ij are long root elements of G, which for a fixed i generate a long root group (cf. (3.9)). Let
Since r 1 (e ±2 ) l = r −1 (e ∓2 ) and r 1 (e ±3 ) l = r −1 (e ±3 ) by matrix calculations,
Finally, since Ω + ( e ±2 , e ±3 ) is the identity on e 1 , e −1 ,
(3.8)
Constructing Q and N G (Q) = Q L
We now proceed to the second stage of our preliminary constructions. Set
(5 i d − 2 and 1 j k),
All of the elements r ij , and the generators for L, are constructed in O(μd log q)-time. [Br1, Section 4.4.2] , Q =Q with the stated probability.
We assume now that Q =Q, and turn to the proof of [KS1, Lemma 4.14] from the third paragraph onward. In that proof it is shown that a certain group G α (generators for which were obtained in a manner analogous to our construction of generators for the group
We now use L in place of the quotient group H = G α /Q in the proof of [KS1, Lemma 4.14] (which is shown there to be iso-
Remark 3.11. The "prime" notation in the previous proof is used to distinguish between the vector space V underlying the black box group G and the concrete space V that we constructed in Section 3.1.3. The space V is used only within proofs; see also the proofs of Lemmas 3.22 and 4.9.
Remark 3.12. In the preceding lemma we see a fundamental difference between [KS1] and the present paper: since we did not have to handle some of the small field cases that caused a great deal of annoyance in [KS1] , we were able to obtain a complement L without using the "effective transitivity" of the subgroup Q (cf. [KS1, Lemma 4.17] ). This simplification is facilitated by the nature of the element σ we employ here, which, in its action on the module underlying G, induces the identity on the 2-dimensional support of a; the singular points of this hyperbolic line correspond to the groupsQ andQ l . Hence, the σ -conjugates of D J all normaliseQ andQ l , unlike their counterparts in [KS1] , which had to be modified in order to have this property (cf. [KS1, Corollary 4.18] ). Nevertheless, in Section 4 we will present a faster, randomised version of "effective transitivity." Remark 3.13. At this stage of the algorithm, there appears to be no easy way to verify that Q and L are the desired subgroupsQ andL. Thus the main algorithm to date is Monte Carlo rather than Las Vegas. However, the uneasiness this causes will be removed following the execution of Procedure 3.21 in 3.3.3; that routine provides, as a by-product, a "correctness check" for our construction ofQ. Thus we will henceforth assume that Q =Q and dispense with the "dot" notation.
Total timing and reliability for Section 3.1 ("large" fields)
By Lemmas 3.2, 3.4 and 3.10, we see that all of the preliminary constructions are obtained with probability
Preliminary constructions for "small" fields
We next consider the case q < 16. Although timing considerations prevent us from using the entire algorithm in [KS1, Section 4] to handle these small fields, we can make use of some of its key subroutines to obtain analogues of the preliminary constructions in Section 3.1. We may assume that d 9, since otherwise q < 16 and d 8 so we can use brute force.
Remark 3.14. Due to the use of recursion, the reliability estimates of most of the randomised subroutines in [KS1] depend upon d. Our approach avoids recursion and hence this dependence on d: we are usually able to improve (by a factor of log d) the timing of subroutines from [KS1] . In addition, the timing for any call to the SL(2, q)-oracle reduces, in this setting, to O(μ).
The elements t and σ
In Section 3.1, the commuting elements a and σ were fundamental to our preliminary constructions. For small q the situation is not quite so straightforward, but the hard work has already been done in [KS1, Section 4.2.1]. In each of the nine cases considered therein, a long root element t is constructed, together with an element τ fixing some point x + in the support of t. This is achieved using up to c 1 choices of element from G, and possibly up to Reliability. In [KS1, Section 4.2.1], c 1 and c 2 were chosen so that success is ensured with probability 1 − 1/8d 2 ; here we crudely modified c 1 and c 2 so that we succeed with probability 1 − 1/8 (cf. Remark 3.14). 
Constructing
i : Ω − (V i ) → J i to construct subgroups Q 8i , G 8i and D i , where G 8i = (Ω − (V i ) x i ) Ψ i , Q 8i = O p (G 8i ) and G 8i = Q 8i D i ,(3.
Some elements of J
We may again assume that elements of Ω + (6, q) are written relative to a standard basis e 1 , e 2 , e 3 , e −1 , e −2 , e −3 , and construct all of the elements and subgroups obtained in Section 3.1.3. We may further assume that t is contained in the long root group R 1 .
ConstructingQ andL
Exactly as in [KS1, Section 4.3 .1], use the 2 6 groups Q 8i and G 8i , together with the element τ , to (probably) construct the groups Q and N G (Q) . Use [KS1, Section 4.3.2] to (probably) construct a complement L to Q in N G (Q) . Then modify the generating set for Q to consist of L-conjugates of generators of R 1 . We obtain all of the elements and subgroups in Section 3.2 with probability
Algorithms for Q
Let Ψ J : Ω + (V J ) → J be the isomorphism constructed by Procedure 3.3 or Section 3.2.2, and let Q and L be the groups constructed in (3.9) or Section 3.2.4. Recall that (with high probability) Q is the natural orthogonal module for L, where L corresponds to the group Ω ε (V ) e 1 ,e −1 ∼ = Ω ε (d − 2, q). However, since we do not have the action of F q on Q, we cannot yet regard Q algorithmically as an F q -module. The main construction in this section constitutes a step in this direction: in Section 3.3.3 we obtain a matrix A Q representing a nondegenerate L-invariant quadratic form on Q.
Evaluating forms
In this subsection and the next we present two technical subroutines involving Ω + (6, q)-subgroups that are needed for our construction of the matrix A Q .
Let K = S K be any given black box group isomorphic to Ω + (6, q), and let Ψ K : Ω + (6, q) → K be an effective isomorphism. Denote the invariant quadratic form on the underlying 6-space V K by φ, fix a standard basis of V K relative to φ, and let f 1 , f −1 be a hyperbolic pair in this basis. Let Q K denote the subgroup O p (Ω + (6, q) 
Specifically, the following subroutine takes, as input, the effective isomorphism Ψ K and any element u ∈ Q K , and outputs the scalar φ Ψ K (u) ∈ F q . (Of course the subroutine can then also compute values for the associated bilinear form ( , ) Ψ K via the equation
Subroutine A. Use Lemma 2.16 to compute the preimage
Compute the vector f −1 u relative to our standard basis, and return the f 1 -component of this vector.
Lemma 3.17. Subroutine A is a Las Vegas routine that returns Ψ K (u), with probability
, where r 1 (w) = u (see Eqs. (2.5) and (2.11)). The proof now follows from (2.4) by noting that f −1 r 1 (w) = f −1 + w + φ(w)f 1 . The stated timing and reliability estimates are precisely those for Lemma 2.16. 2
Matching forms
In the next section we will need to consider a second naturally embedded Ω + (6, q)- In this setting the following subroutine takes as input J , K, Ψ J , Ψ K and a nonsingular element u 0 ∈ Q ∩ J 0 , and returns a scalar λ ∈ F q . Subroutine B. Using Subroutine A in Section 3.3.1 twice (once with input Ψ J and u 0 , and once with input Ψ K and u 0 ), compute α 1 := φ Ψ J (u 0 ) and
Lemma 3.18. Subroutine B is a Las Vegas routine which, with probability at least 1 − 1/64, in O(ξ + χ log q + μ log 2 q)-time returns a scalar λ such that 
The matrix A Q
We do not yet know that Q is the correct groupQ, nor have we constructed an action of F q turning Q into an F q -space. Thus, although there is a unique nondegenerate L-invariant quadratic form φ Q on Q that extends the nondegenerate L J -invariant quadratic form φ Ψ J on Q J (defined, effectively, by Subroutine A), we do not yet have φ Q available to work with. Nevertheless, we can now construct a lower triangular ((d − 2) × (d − 2))-matrix A Q = Jα ij K, with entries in F q , that will allow us to specify the bilinear form ( , ) Q associated with φ Q . Namely, we will have
where r i := r i1 , 1 i d − 2 (cf. (3.9)), will be a basis of Q once we know that Q =Q is an F q -space of dimension d − 2. More precisely, in the notation of 3.1.3 and (3.9), the following procedure takes as input
the subgroup J 0 J (isomorphic to Ω + (4, q)) and Q 0 := Q ∩ J 0 , (3) the elements r i and u 0 := r 1 (e 2 + e −2 )Ψ J ∈ Q 0 , and (4) the subgroup L, and returns one of the following outputs:
(a) A matrix A Q = Jα ij K together with the report "Q =Q" (this is the desired output); (b) The report "Q =Q" (this output occurs if the procedure runs as expected, but we failed to generateQ in Section 3.1.4 or 3.2.4); or (c) The report "failure" (this output occurs if the procedure encounters bad luck with its random choices). If A Q + A tr Q is nonsingular, return A Q together with the report "Q =Q". If A Q + A tr Q is singular, report "Q =Q" and stop.
Lemma 3.22. Procedure 3.21 is a Las Vegas algorithm which, with probability at least
15/16, in O(d 2 log d · log q{ξ + χ log q + μ log 2 q} + d 3
log q)-time returns an output of type (a) or (b). Moreover, if one of these outputs is returned, then it is guaranteed to be correct in the following sense:
for a type (a) output, Q =Q with probability 1 and (3.20) holds; and for a type (b) output, Q =Q with probability 1.
Proof. We consider correctness, reliability and timing of Procedure 3.21 separately. Recall that, since Remarks 3.13 and 3.16, we have been assuming that Q is the desired groupQ. satisfy (3.20) . This holds when i = j since r i is a long root element (cf. (2.8)). Since we want A Q to be lower triangular, there is nothing to prove concerning the remaining α ij initialised in step 1. Consider a fixed pair 1 i < j d − 2 in step 2, and suppose that the procedure succeeds in producing the following:
Correctness. This principally involves showing that the scalars α ij
iii a scalar λ; and 2.iv a scalar α ij .
In Lemma 3.18 we use the element u 0 , which is nonsingular with respect to φ Q (since Q 0 is isometric to the hyperbolic line e 2 , e −2 ): λ in step 2.iii satisfies φ Q = λφ Q . Hence, Thus, Q is the desired groupQ precisely as the test in step 3 decides.
Reliability. Observe that Lemma 2.16, Subroutines A and B are Las Vegas algorithms, so the present procedure is also Las Vegas.
Since an upper bound on the probability that Q =Q was already obtained in 3.1.4 and 3.2.4, and was included in the reliability estimates for Sections 3.1 and 3.2, we may once again assume from now on that Q =Q. , so that dim V K 6. For such Q K , moreover, since V K contains the hyperbolic line x + , x − , and since Q K is isometric to V K / x + , x − , it follows that V K is nondegenerate of (maximal) Witt index 3. Thus, with the stated probability, for a fixed choice c ∈ L the group K is isomorphic to a subgroup of Ω + (6, q). Claim 1 now follows by noting that, for such a c, the groups Q K and Q l K generate a subgroup of K isomorphic to Ω + (6, q).
Claim 1. For a fixed pair
Claim 2. For a fixed pair 1 i < j d − 2, steps 2.i-2.iv produce α ij with probability at least 1 − 1/8d 2 .
For, if c ∈ L gives rise to K ∼ = Ω + (6, q), then Lemma 2.16 produces an effective isomorphism Ψ K : Ω + (6, q) → K with probability > 1/2. Hence, by Claim 1, c produces a suitable Ψ K with probability > (1/4) · (1/2). The probability that none of the 12 log(4d) choices c produces a suitable Ψ K is therefore at most (7/8) 12 log(4d) < 1/(4d) 2 .
On the other hand, the repetitions of Subroutines A and B in steps 2.iii and 2.iv ensure that each of the scalars λ and α ij is obtained with probability > 1 − 1/(8d) 2 − 1/(8d) 2 . For, a single call to Lemma 3.17 succeeds with probability 1 − 1/128; thus all of the calls fail with probability (1/2 7 ) log(8d)/3 < (1/8d) 2 . Similarly, all of the calls to Lemma 3.18 fail with probability (1/8d) 2 .
Hence, steps 2.i-iv compute the desired scalar α ij with probability > 1 − (1/16d 2 + 1/64d 2 + 1/64d 2 ) > 1 − 1/8d 2 , as claimed.
It now follows that the probability that at least one of the at most d 2 /2 iterations of step 2 fails to produce the corresponding scalar α ij for some i, j is less than (d 2 /2)(1/8d 2 ) = 1/16. Thus the procedure computes all of the scalars α ij with probability > 15/16. 
Defining Ψ on Q(x + )
The following procedure takes as input the matrix A Q returned by Procedure 3.21, and returns a bijection, f * , between generating sets for the matrix group Q(x + ) and the black box group Q. (Recall the definition of the elements r ij : see (3.9) for q 16, and Section 3.2.4 for q < 16.) Procedure 3.23.
1. Initialise w 1 := e 2 , w 2 := e −2 , w 3 := e 3 , w 4 := e −3 . 
Using linear algebra in the
Only linear algebra and bookkeeping are required for the construction of T (x + ). The timing for Procedure 3.23 is therefore dominated by that of our earlier constructions. The following result demonstrates that the bijection f * output by the procedure is induced by an epimorphism Ω ε (V ) → G upon restriction; note, however, that the homomorphism Q(x + ) → Q defined by f * is not yet an effective homomorphism. 
Proof. We will show that f * extends (uniquely) to an isometry f : Q(x + ) → Q that coincides with Ψ J on Q(x + ) ∩ Ω + (V J ); the result will then follow from Proposition 2.12.
(Note that the quadratic form on Q(x + ) is φ x + , defined as in (2.5) It remains to show that r ij Ψ = r ij for 1 i d − 2, 1 j k (that is, we must verify that the bijection f * is consistent with the action of the field). This is clear for 1 i 4, since f * was constructed to agree with Ψ J on T (x + ) ∩ Ω + (V J ). (3.26) as desired. 2
The data structure for Ψ
We are finally in a position to describe our data structure.
Algorithms for the natural representation
Our strategy is to follow the algorithm presented in [Br1] for orthogonal groups in their natural representation. We therefore provide a brief commentary of the relevant parts of that algorithm, and indicate the modifications needed to make use of it in the present setting.
In [Br1, 4.4 ] a generating set, T (x + ), consisting of long root elements, is constructed for the group Q(x + ). As the notation suggests, this generating set is an analogue of the one in (3.24), and has all of the properties of the latter set.
Then, in [Br1, 4.5] , the set T (x + ) is replaced by a standard generating set Δ(x + ). More precisely, each element of a fixed, prescribed set Δ(x + ) is constructed using a short SLP from T (x + ). The routine to construct Δ(x + ) takes, in fact, any generating set T for Q(x + ), and produces SLPs of length O(d log q) from T to the elements of Δ(x + ). Thus, although the set T (x + ) obtained here may differ from its analogue in [Br1] , we can still construct exactly the same set Δ(x + ) obtained in [Br1, 4.5] .
Finally, in [Br1, 4.6] , O(kd 2 ) elements of a "canonical" generating set T for Ω ε (V ) are constructed using short SLPs from the set Δ(x + ) ∪ Δ(x + ) l . In our setting, by using the subroutines in [Br1, 4.4 through 4.6] we can construct an SLP of length O(d log q) from T (x + ) ∪ {l } to each element of the analogous set T constructed in [Br1] .
Timing. The total timing for Sections 4.5 and 4.6 of [Br1] is O(d 3 log 2 q), and hence is dominated by the timing for our previous constructions.
New generators for G
By Lemma 3.25, the obvious bijection T (x + ) ∪ {l } → S * Q ∪ {l} is the restriction of a unique epimorphism Ψ : Ω ε (V ) → G. In 3.4.1, an SLP was constructed from T (x + ) ∪ {l } to each t ∈ T ; use the above bijection to find the image t Ψ , and set
Timing. In fact we do not evaluate each SLP from scratch: this would require O(μd log q · kd 2 ) = O(μd 3 log 2 q)-time. Instead, we construct the image of
-time is required to construct all of the elements of S * . Hence, we construct S * in O(μd 2 log q)-time.
The data structure
The data structure returned by the preprocessing phase of the algorithm contains the following information (compare with the summary at the start of Section 3): 
Total timing and reliability for Section 3
The failure probabilities of the subroutines in this section sum to less than 1/2. The timing is dominated by Sections 3.1.1 and 3.3.3. Hence, our algorithm returns a suitable data structure, with probability > 1/2, in O(d 3 log d log q{d + log 3 q} + ξd 2 log d log q + χd 2 log d log 2 q)-time, as stated in Theorem 1.1.
Straight-line programs
The previous section dealt with the preprocessing phase of the algorithm: we produced a data structure that specifies an epimorphism, Ψ , from a matrix group Ω ε (V ) to our given black box group G = S . This section deals with the application phase of the algorithm: we present routines that compute images and preimages under Ψ . It suffices to give algorithms to solve each of the following problems:
For example, given g ∈ Ω ε (V ), we take the SLP returned by (SLP1) and evaluate it from the set S * (via the bijection T → S * ) to obtain the image g Ψ in G.
An algorithm for (SLP1)
In [Br1, Section 5], a deterministic O(d 3 log q)-time algorithm is presented, which writes an SLP of length O(d 2 log q) from essentially the same generating set T as the one constructed here to any given element of Ω ε (d, q) . This yields an O(μd 2 log q)-time algorithm to find the Ψ -image of any given element of Ω ε (d, q) , as stated in Theorem 1.1.
Constructing Z(G)
Until now, we have assumed only that G is a homomorphic image of a known orthogonal group: we do not yet know whether G is Ω ε (d, q) or PΩ ε (d, q) . Using (SLP1), we can now decide which of those groups G is, by constructing Z(G): We consider the construction of Z(G) to be part of the preprocessing phase, and its timing is dominated by that of Section 3. Table 1 [KS1] algorithm Present algorithm
An algorithm for (SLP2)
As in [KS1, Br2] , it is much more difficult to write SLPs within the black box group G, so that significantly different techniques are required for problem (SLP2). The algorithm we give is a modification of that in [KS1, Proposition 4.23] . Indeed, most of the work in this subsection involves adapting various subroutines from [KS1] so that they can be used in our setting, often refining them in order to satisfy our more stringent timing requirements.
Linear algebra in Q
It now becomes essential to regard Q algorithmically both as an F q -and F p -space. (Recall that we were able to finesse this issue in the preprocessing phase; notably in Section 3.3.4.) It is possible to approach this problem in a manner similar to that in which the unitary case was handled in [Br2, Section 4.4.3] . However, the more complicated structure of orthogonal groups and, ironically, the fact that Q is abelian here, renders this method rather involved. In the interests of exposition, we prefer to adapt routines from [KS1] that handle such computations. To do so we will need analogues of the following constructions. Table 1 serves as a "dictionary," enabling the reader to pass back and forth between [KS1] and the present paper. We constructed generators for Q and a suitable complement L in Section 3.1.
which is effective in both directions, in view of (SLP1) the restriction of Ψ to the subgroup Ω ε (V ) e 1 ,e −1 is effective in one direction; fortunately this is all we will need. Finally, the restriction of Ψ to Ω ε (V ) e 1 confirms the existence of λ • in (c). (The map λ • and its analogue here are listed in square brackets in Table 1 
for Q can be found such that the following hold: Case p = 2. Write d = 2n (in the present paper the letter "m" used in [KS1, Lemma 4.19] has been reserved for the Witt index of V ). This time W 1 is a nondegenerate 2-space, which we choose so that it lies in the 4-space e 2 , e 3 , e −2 , e −3 . Find a matrix c n−1 ∈ Ω ε ( e 1 , e −1 ⊥ ) moving the nondegenerate 2-space W n−1 to a 2-space Y n−1 within e 2 , e 3 , e −2 , e −3 . Use (SLP1) to construct c n−1 := c n−1 Ψ ∈ L. Relabel the groups constructed in [KS1, Lemma 4.19] : for 1 l n − 1, put A 2l−1 := A lx , and A 2l := A ly . Fix vectors v 1 , v 2 ∈ W 1 , y 1 , y 2 ∈ Y n−1 , and, for 1 j k, use (SLP1) to find each of the following elements of J :
Put t Parts (iii) and (iv) of the previous lemma permit us to compute effectively within Q both as an F p -space and an abstract group, respectively; our next lemma gives the algorithms necessary for computing with Q as F q -space. then the expression "write u ∈ Q as an F q -vector relative to B" will mean "find
Lemma 4.5. There are deterministic algorithms for each of the following. Proof. (i) Use Lemma 4.1(iii) to write u as an F p -vector relative to B p using some
To see that this output is correct, note that each t ij ∈ B p was constructed in the proof of Lemma 4.1 either as the image under Ψ J of an element r 1 (ρ j −1 w) for some w ∈ e 1 , e −1 ⊥ , or else as an explicit L-conjugate of such an element. Hence, just as in (3.26), if
(ii) This follows immediately from (i) (cf. [KS1, 4.4.3(5) 
Exploiting geometry
We have seen in Section 2.1.1 that each singular point x in an orthogonal module determines a subgroup Q(x) of the corresponding orthogonal group. Thus the conjugates of the subgroup Q provide us with models of singular points within the given black box group G. The ability to distinguish between given points, determine whether two points are "perpendicular" and, under certain geometric constraints, conjugate one point to another, are fundamental tasks that are crucial to our algorithm.
Lemma 4.6. There is an O(μd)-time deterministic algorithm, that decides whether or not two given "points" are equal.
Proof. See [KS1, p. 72] (noting that the timing of this algorithm is O(μd) rather than O(μd log d), since our group Q was generated using only O(d) long root groups). 2
Although perpendicularity testing and conjugacy are also dealt with in [KS1, Section 4.3.2] , we need new algorithms to bring these problems into polynomial time. Our methods will make essential use of the SL(2, q)-oracle, often giving rise to randomised (rather than deterministic) algorithms. We begin by describing a special use for the SL (2, q) The next procedure finds generators for the long root group Q g 1 ∩ Q g 2 when Q g 1 and Q g 2 are distinct and perpendicular. Recall that the element h in S * , introduced in 3.1.3(iii), acts on Q as a scalar that generates F q as F p -space (by (2.7), its preimage h in Ω + (V J ) has this property with respect to Q(x + )). In particular, if r is any root element of Q, then the normal closure r h is the root group containing r.
Procedure 4.10 (intersection).
Lemma 4.11. Procedure 4.10 is an O(χ)-time Las Vegas algorithm that returns Q g 1 ∩ Q g 2 with probability > 0.49. (2, q) ). The correctness and stated reliability now follow directly from Lemma 2.9. (Note that if z = 1, then
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2.9(b) that
The following is a simple modification of [KS1, Lemma 4.16] , bringing it into polynomial time.
Lemma 4.12. In deterministic O(μd + χ)-time, given a long root element u not normalising Q g , a point Q w can be found containing u and perpendicular to Q g .
Proof.
Proceed exactly as in the proof of [KS1, Lemma 4.16] : test at most one element from each member of a generating set of long root groups for Q g to find a ∈ Q g such that [[a, u] , u] = 1; and let A denote the long root group containing a. Rather than list A, we instead use the fact that A, u ∼ = SL (2, q) , together with the SL(2, q)-oracle, to find
If x is a singular point of an orthogonal space V , then the group Q(x) < Ω ε (V ) acts regularly on the set of singular points not perpendicular to x. The final procedure of this subsection is an algorithmic analogue of this transitivity within our black box group G. It takes as input generators for Q, and elements g 1 , g 2 ∈ G such that neither Q g 1 nor Q g 2 is perpendicular to Q, and outputs the unique element of Q conjugating Q g 1 to Q g 2 (cf. [KS1, Lemma 4.17] ). Lemma 4.14. Procedure 4.13 is an O(χd + μd 2 )-time Las Vegas algorithm that finds the unique u ∈ Q such that Q g 1 u = Q g 2 with probability at least 1/2.
Proof. Let x , x 1 , x 2 denote the singular points of V corresponding to Q, Q g 1 , Q g 2 respectively. The reduction to the perpendicular case is proved in [KS1, Lemma 4.17] . We may therefore assume that Q g 1 and Q g 2 are perpendicular, and hence that x 1 , x 2 is totally singular. Then z ∈ Z = Q g 1 ∩ Q g 2 moves x to a point of the 3-space x , x 1 , x 2 perpendicular to x , and w = x , x z ∩ x 1 , x 2 is the radical of this 3-space. Now Y = Q∩Q z = R( x , w ), R 1 and R 2 induce three distinct transvection groups on x 1 , x 2 , fixing δ , x 1 and x 2 respectively. Hence there exists a unique u ∈ Y moving R 1 to R 2 modulo O p (K); such u evidently moves x 1 to x 2 , as desired. There are at most three calls to Procedure 4.10, each of which is repeated up to three times in order to ensure success with probability at least 1 − (0.51) 3 > 0.867. Hence the procedure finds the unique u ∈ Q with probability at least 0.867 3 > 1/2. The timing is dominated by that of Procedure 4.8. 2
Straight-line programs from S *
We are finally in position to give our algorithm for (SLP2). In fact, we merely give a commentary on the proof of [KS1, Proposition 4.23] , indicating where subroutines given here are substituted for ones in [KS1] , and giving a correspondingly revised timing estimate.
We are given g ∈ G. Find y ∈ {1, l} ∪ B l such that Q gy and Q are not perpendicular. (Our element l and generating set B for Q are suitable analogues of j (γ ) and S * (2) appearing in [KS1, 4.2.2(iii) ] and [KS1, 4.3.3] , respectively.) Using Procedure 4.13 instead of [KS1, Lemma 4.17] , find u, v ∈ Q such that gyul −1 v normalises both Q and Q l , and replace g by gyul −1 v. (Repeat the randomised Procedure 4.13 twice, if necessary, for each of u and v.)
We have now reduced to the case where g normalises Q and Q l . Fix a nonsingular vector w ∈ Q and use Lemma 4.5(iii) to compute φ Q (w), φ Q (w g ) and φ Q (w h + ), where h + ∈ S * is the element constructed in 3.1.3(iv). Then, as in [KS1, Lemma 4.6(a) ], φ Q (w g ) = λ 2 φ Q (w) and φ Q (w h + ) = ζ 2 φ Q (w) for nonzero scalars λ, ζ with ζ of order q − 1. Use DLog(F * q ) to find i such that (ζ 2 ) i = λ 2 , and replace g by gh −i . Now g induces an isometry of Q. Use Lemma 4.5(ii) to find the matrixg representing this isometry. If necessary, use Wall forms and the element h + once again to modify g so thatg ∈ Ω ε (Q).
Finally, write the unique matrix g ∈ Ω ε (V ) e 1 ,e −1 whose restriction to e 1 , e −1 ⊥ isg.
Use (SLP1) to write an SLP of length O(d 2 log q) from T to g , and evaluate this SLP from S * to obtain an element g 0 ∈ G such that gg −1 0 ∈ Z(G). In the cases where G is not simple, S * contains a generator for Z(G); hence the SLP is easily modified to give one to g, as required.
Timing. The timing is dominated by the call to Lemma 4.5(ii) and the evaluation of an SLP of length O (d 2 log q) inside G. Hence, we obtain the desired SLP in O(χd 2 + μd 2 log q) = O(χd 2 )-time, as stated in Theorem 1.1.
Reliability. Randomisation occurs only in finding the elements u, v ∈ Q using Procedure 4.13. Repeating each such call ensures success with probability at least (3/4) · (3/4) > 1/2.
Concluding remarks

Verifying a presentation
Our assumption in Theorem 1.1 was that the given black box group G = S is known to be a homomorphic image of Ω ε (d, q) . Our constructive recognition algorithm is a Las Vegas algorithm only under this assumption.
In practice, however, it is unlikely that a user will know with certainty that a given G = S is the image of a certain orthogonal group. There are two methods in print to determine that G is probably a homomorphic image of Ω ε (d, q) for known ε, d and q ( [KS2, BKPS] ; compare [KS1, Section 7.2.1]). We make no claim as to what our algorithm will output if G is not what we think it is (although it can safely be stated that it will almost always fail). In such a situation, in order to be certain that a positive output Ψ from our procedure really is an epimorphism, one must construct and verify a suitable presentation for G. (There are additional reasons why a presentation for G is desirable; see [L-G] .)
Thus, we will assume that G is indeed an epimorphic image of Ω ε (V ). Let Ψ : Ω ε (V ) → G be an alleged epimorphism returned by the preprocessing phase of our algorithm. A presentation for G can be constructed and verified as follows (cf. [KS1, Section 7.2.1]).
Use [BGKLP] to write a "short" presentation X | R of Ω ε (d, q) in O(d 4 log 2 q) time: a map ϕ : X → Ω ε (d, q) such that, if F (X) is the free group with X and if N = R F (X) , then ϕ induces an isomorphismφ : F (X)/N → Ω ε (d, q) . Use (SLP1) to find S * * := XϕΨ ⊆ G. For each word w(x 1 , . . .) ∈ R (where x 1 , . . . ∈ X), find w(x 1 ϕΨ, . . .) and test whether this is 1 in G; if so, then S * * is a homomorphic image of Ω ε (V ), otherwise it is not a homomorphic image.
Finally, test that G = S * * by verifying that S ⊆ S * * as follows. Use (SLP2) to find SΨ −1 ⊆ Ω ε (V ) . Use (SLP1) to write short SLPs from Xϕ to SΨ −1 , and evaluate these SLPs from XϕΨ = S * * in order to (try to) obtain S. (Of course, if S ⊆ S * * is false then G is not a homomorphic image of Ω ε (V ) .)
The timing for such a verification is dominated by the construction of S * * , which is obtained in O(d 2 log q · μd 2 log q) = O(μd 4 log 2 q)-time.
Other perfect central extensions of PΩ ε (V )
We have focused on epimorphic images of Ω ε (V ). However, our algorithm applies with almost no change to homomorphic images of the corresponding spin group, or, more precisely, to all perfect central extensions G of PΩ ε (V ). The only slight change has to do with finding Z(G), but this is accomplished in almost the same manner as before.
Alternative algorithm for Ω − (6, q)
The case Ω − (6, q) was excluded in Theorem 1.1. Recall that, for this group, we could simply switch to the equivalent case SU(4, q) and use [Br2] ; but then we would need an additional discrete log oracle for cyclic groups of order q + 1. However, such an oracle can be sidestepped; essentially the same situation arose in [KS1, Section 4.6.3] . The algorithm presented there can be used here, replacing [KS1, by Procedure 4.8, Lemma 4.12 and Procedure 4.13, respectively. This allows us to obtain a data structure behaving as in Section 3. Then straight-line programs can be found as in Section 4.
